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Abstract: This investigation focuses on participation and related investment 
patterns in job related non-formal education (NFE) in selected European countries. 
Broadening previous research formats of NFE are distinguished by investment 
including financial and time investments by employers, employees and public 
authorities. By this, company-sponsored and individual-financed NFE are 
distinguished sharply and cases with shared investment between employers and 
employees (co-financed NFE) and between employers, employees and public 
funding (co-financed pooled NFE) are accounted for, additionally. For explaining 
participation in NFE supply and demand models are referred to. Hypotheses on 
cross-country differences for investment in NFE refer to the Varieties-of-
Capitalism approach and countries are selected representing different varieties of 
capitalism (Norway, Sweden, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Spain, France, UK). 
Analyses are based on data of the Adult Education Survey (AES) 2011/12. 
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1 Introduction and Overview 
International comparisons on adult education and training (AET) 1 participation 
reveal substantial differences between countries. Countries with similar rates are 
often grouped, usually showing high participation rates in the Nordic Countries, 
low rates in the Southern European Countries, medium rates in the Anglo-saxon 
countries, and medium to low rates in the Post-socialists Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries (e.g. Bassanini et al. 2005; Desjardins et al. 2006; 
Boateng 2009; Green 2006; Roosmaa and Saar 2010, 2012; Rubenson 2006; 
Rubenson and Desjardins 2009). Even though the familiar pattern of advantaged 
groups participating in AET (employed, high-skilled, young age groups) is evident 
in all European member states, the extent of inequality in access differs 
substantially between countries. In general, research on hindering and promoting 
conditions for AET participation suggest a complex interplay of structurally 
determined conditions and individual characteristics (e.g. Desjardins et al. 2006; 
Rubenson 2006; Rubenson and Desjardins 2009; Roosmaa and Saar 2010, 2012). 
Thereby, recently developed models for explaining AET participation focus on the 
match of demand and supply aspects and more or less explicitly include macro 
level indicators as relevant framing conditions (e.g. Green 2006; Rubenson and 
Desjardins 2009; Boeren et al. 2010). International comparative analyses show that 
countries with a similar extent of inequality in access to AET also show 
considerable similarities in terms of economic systems, labour market policies and 
education and training systems (e.g. Roosmaa and Saar 2010, 2012).   
 Whereas international comparative research on the amount of (in)equality in 
access to AET has led to interesting insights regarding country differences (e.g. 
Desjardins et al. 2006; Rubenson und Desjardins 2009; Roosmaa und Saar 2010, 
2012), international comparative investigations on investment patterns of AET 
have been done to limited extend (e.g. Brunello et al. 2007; Desjardins and 
Rubenson 2011). European data suggest that about 40 % (Schönfeld and Behringer 
2015, 307f. ff.) to 60 % (Boateng 2009, 1) of employed participants in job related 
non-formal education (NFE) are sponsored fully or partly by employers and 
employers are the primary source supporting AET (Brunello et al. 2007, 197; 
Desjardins and Rubenson 2011, 56, FIBS und DIE 2013; Rubenson 2006, 228ff. 
ff.).2 If sources of investment are considered, determinants of AET participation 
differ substantially (e.g. Brunello et al. 2007; Desjardins and Rubenson 2011). An 
analysis for Germany suggests to distinguish strictly between company-sponsored 
and individual-financed AET and additionally to differentiate a co-financed format, 
where employers and employees share the investment, including time investment 
(Kaufmann and Widany 2013). Results show that co-investment in AET is of 
quantitative relevance and participation patterns differ from company-sponsored 
AET. 
 Referring to these findings this paper focuses on participation patterns in an 
international comparative perspective by distinguishing company-sponsored and 
individual-financed AET distinctively and additionally accounting for co-financed 
                                                     
1 As definitions and concepts of adult education differ between surveys, Adult Education 
and Training (AET) is referred to as an overall term, including any organized format of 
education and training of adults. 
2  The share of employers financing adult education differs considerably depending on 
questionnaires and operationalization in the different survey concepts (e.g. Bassanini et 
al. 2005; Kaufmann and Widany 2013). 
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formats where employers and employees and employers, employees and the state 
share the investment for job related AET. Thereby, monetary and time investments 
are considered. The first question is, whether co-financing AET is of relevance in 
other European countries, too, and whether participation rates differ between 
countries. The second question refers to country-specific participation patterns if 
these formats of AET are distinguished.  
 The paper is structured as follows: First, the state of research on cross-country 
differences of AET-participation is outlined and framed by theoretical approaches. 
Following, research results on hindering and promoting conditions for participation 
are presented if investment in AET is considered. The Varieties-of-Capitalism 
approach (VoC) allows to distinguish countries according to characteristics of 
labour markets and skill formation systems and thereby enables to derive 
assumptions regarding investment patterns in adult education and training (e.g. 
Dieckhoff et al. 2007,  84; Roosmaa and Saar 2010, 2012; Saar et al. 2013; Saar 
and Ure 2013, section 2). Section 3 defines the research question and countries 
selected for the analyses. Information on the data base (Adult Education Survey 
AES 2011), sample restrictions and descriptions are provided in section 4 and 
analytical results in section 5. The paper closes with implications for further 
investigations. 
2 Theoretical framings and state of research 
2.1 Cross-country differences of AET-participation 
Overall, participation in AET is regarded as the result of a complex interplay of 
structurally determined conditions and individual characteristics including 
situational, dispositional and institutional barriers (e.g. Desjardins et al. 2006; 
Roosmaa and Saar 2010; 2012; Rubenson 2006; Rubenson and Desjardins 2009). 
Recently developed models for explaining AET participation consider this 
reciprocal relation of individual and structural aspects and focus on the match of 
demand and supply patterns which are expected to mutually influence each other 
(e.g. Boeren et al. 2010; Green 2006; Rubenson and Desjardins 2009). Demand for 
AET can be pursued by individuals or firms; supply of AET can be arranged by 
adult education institutions but also by employers resp. firms.  
The state of research on determinants of AET participation reflects these 
relations and some results are quite stable across countries. Generally, socio-
demographic characteristics like high formal qualification grades and high literacy 
skills positively influence access to AET (e.g. Desjardins et al. 2006, 59ff.; 
Bassanini et al. 2005, 207ff.; Boateng 2009, 1ff.). The influence of age is not 
consistent. Brunello et al. (2007, 208f.) find that increasing age is negatively 
associated with participation in AET whereas Dieckhoff et al. (2007) do not find 
this pattern for Denmark, Finland and Ireland. Apart from individual related 
attributes, job related characteristics influence AET participation. This is 
presumably associated with the overall result of a large share of AET being job-
related and supported by employers (Boateng 2009; Brunello et al. 2007; 
Desjardins and Rubenson 2011; FIBS and DIE 2013; Schönfeld and Behringer 
2015). Being gainfully employed and in high resp. skill intense job positions, in 
large enterprises or the public sector, working full-time and on a permanent 
contract influence AET-participation positively (e.g. Desjardins et al. 2006, 59ff., 
65; Brunello et al. 2007, 207ff.). Even though, these patterns are quite similar 
across countries, the extent of inequality in access to AET differs considerably 
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between countries (e.g. Roosmaa and Saar 2012; Boateng 2009, 3f.). 
For explaining these cross-country differences, theoretical approaches address 
macro-level indicators, which are assumed to shape specific conditions which in 
turn affect individual behaviour and also the supply for adult education. Whereas 
educational and sociological approaches focus primarily on education, training and 
skill formation systems for the explanation of differences in school-to-work-
transitions (e.g. Allmendinger 1989; Brzinsky-Fay 2007; Gangl 2003), economic 
and political approaches address the relationship between state regulation and 
labour market systems for explaining international disparities in terms of economic 
and political structures (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Estevez-Abé et al. 2001; 
Shavit et al. 1998). Hence, theoretical approaches originating from political, 
economic and sociological disciplines are getting into focus for explaining cross-
country differences in AET participation (e.g. Saar and Ure 2013). By this, macro 
level indicators like skill formation systems, education policies, labour market 
contexts and welfare state models are referred to, expecting to influence supply and 
demand for AET on the micro (individual) and meso (e.g. educational institutions/ 
firms as providers or suppliers) level. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes ‘welfare state regimes’ according to 
socio-political arrangements between state, market, and family. Central criterion 
for the distinction is the amount of decommodification resulting in three distinct 
welfare state regimes: Liberal welfare state regimes are characterized by means-
tested assistance, modest universal transfers and social insurance plans (e.g. UK, 
Canada, Australia); conservative or corporatistic welfare state regimes are marked 
by state subsidiary responsibility following e.g. family support and status 
consistent rights of state assistance (e.g. Austria, Germany, France, Italy) and 
sociodemocratic welfare state regimes are described by equal citizen’s right to 
services and benefits and integration of welfare and work (e.g. Nordic Countries) 
(ibid., 26ff.). Focusing on welfare states influencing individual perceptions, 
Rubenson and Desjardins (2009, 194ff.) propose a model of ‘bounded agency’. 
Their descriptive results do not support the assumptions of diverse individual 
perceptions of barriers to participate in AET in different welfare state regimes. 
However, in the Nordic countries (sociodemocratic welfare state regimes) more 
individuals participate in AET despite perceived barriers. Further, results indicate 
less inequality in access to AET (ibid.) and a longer time spent in AET in these 
countries (Desjardins and Rubenson 2013). Analyses on firms providing training in 
different welfare state regimes also reveal mixed results. Positive correlations are 
detected between countries GDP/capita and the amount of firms providing training, 
yet, countries with a similar GDP/capita show considerable differences in the 
provision of firm-provided training (Markowitsch et al. 2013). 
Another approach recently referred to for explaining cross-country differences 
in AET participation is the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, originally 
aiming on explaining country specific constitutions of political economies 
(Estevez-Abé et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). Thereby, interactions of specific 
actors, regulations and institutions are focused on and characteristics of the labour 
market and the skill formation system are explicitly included. One of the main 
arguments is the mutual influence resp. dependency of diverse actors, institutions 
and regulations conditionally shaping specific configurations of political 
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001, 5-7ff.; 15ff.). Emphasizing the role of 
economic enterprises, it is assumed that the nature of the established relationships 
influences companies’ main coordination forms which in turn affect companies’ 
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product market strategies. This strategy is assumed to be influenced by rules and 
regulations set by the state, so welfare state regimes are relevant framing 
conditions. According to the assumption of mutual dependencies the established 
relationships and coordination forms in turn influence actions and behaviour of 
other actors. This is summarized by the term ‘institutional complementarities’ 
(ibid., 17), resembling what is meant by the term ‘institutional packages’ 
(Blossfeld 2003; Saar et al. 2013). Roughly speaking, labour market and skill 
formation system characteristics are assumed to interact as institutional 
complementarities and by this, conditionally shape specific configurations of 
political economies, which are termed ‘welfare production regimes’ (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, 5-7ff.;15ff.). Originally, two ideal types of political economy are 
distinguished: ‘liberal market economies’  (LME, e.g. USA) and ‘coordinated 
market economies’ (CME; e.g. Germany) (ibid., 8;19). The so called 
‘Mediterranean countries’ constitute another variety of capitalism, including 
characteristics of both, liberal and coordinated market economies (ibid., 17ff.). 
Finally, the new EU member states of post-socialists Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries are characterized as ‘dependent market economies’ (DME), 
usually being dependent on international companies. Regarding labour markets and 
skill formation systems, welfare production regimes are characterized as follows 
(ibid. 10ff.; Estevez-Abé et al. 2001, 147ff.; Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009, 678ff.): 
• LMEs and DMEs show a combination of weak employment and 
unemployment protection legislations and a general skill profile (e.g. USA, 
UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland as LME) resp. a medium 
general/industry-specific skill profile; Baltic States as DMEs). 
• Contrarily CMEs are characterized by a combination of high protection of 
either employment or unemployment legislations and industry-specific or 
firm-specific skills (e.g. Austria, Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands, 
Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Japan). 
• Mediterranean countries are somewhat in between: often characterized by 
medium social protection legislations and a general skill formation system 
and pronounced segmented labour markets (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Turkey). 
Even though the VoC-approach refers primarily to initial education and training 
systems, assumptions for investment in AET can be derived, by assuming that 
welfare production regimes differ in terms of encouraging employees or firms to 
invest in AET (e.g. Dieckhoff et al. 2007, 84; Roosmaa and Saar 2010, 2012, Saar 
and Ure 2013; Saar et al. 2013). 
Overall, a systematic pattern of AET-participation reflecting these regimes 
has not been identified. Regarding (un-)employment protection Brunello (2001,  
11) finds training incidences being higher in countries with a higher index of 
employment protection whereas Bassanini et al. (2005, 115) find “On the one hand, 
the diffusion of temporary contracts reduce the investment in training; on the other 
hand, the reduction in the degree of employment protection for regular workers 
increases the provision of training.” Concerning equality in access to AET 
Roosmaa and Saar (2010, 181ff.) find that active labour market policies and a low 
level of employment protection legislation promote equality in access. For trade 
union coverage as an indicator for labour market regulation, several studies find 
high trade union coverage promoting the incidence of training (Brunello 2001, 11; 
Booth et al. 2003, 74ff. for the UK) as well as promoting equality in AET-
participation (Roosmaa and Saar 2010). Contrarily, Bassanini et al. (2005, 115f.) 
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do not find an influence of union density on training in Europe. Reasons may be 
related to the fact that union coverage is quite diverse between sectors. Results by 
Dieckhoff et al. (2007, 88f.; 94) suggest that differences are rather located within 
branches than in welfare production regimes. Regarding the stratification of 
education systems results are inconsistent. Generally, training incidence is lower in 
countries with a high stratified education system (Roosmaa and Saar 2010, 193ff.). 
High levels of qualification within the population influence the incidence of AET 
positively (Brunello 2001, 11; Bassanini et al. 2005, 69f.; 77; 99f.) and low levels 
of formal qualifications are negatively associated with participation incidence 
(Roosmaa and Saar 2012, 498). Representing the demand side results strongly 
support that job related characteristics are central determinants for AET 
participation of individuals (e.g. Desjardins et al. 2006, 55ff.). Generally, high skill 
requirements and innovation indices promote AET participation (Bassanini et al. 
2005, 68ff.; Roosmaa and Saar 2012, 495ff.). This corresponds to the result that 
innovation in companies influences companies AET provision positively (e.g. 
Schönfeld and Behringer 2013, 15) and companies experiencing labour and skill 
shortage tend to invest more in AET (Hughes et al. 2004 for Ireland). 
Even though, theoretical approaches referred to often focus on the willingness 
to invest in AET of employees and employers being influenced by specific 
institutional packages (e.g. Roosmaa and Saar 2010, 2012; Boeren et al. 2010; 
Rubenson and Desjardins 2009) studies presented so far do not account for 
investment in AET for analysing participation patterns. The following section 
focuses on participation patterns in an international comparative perspective, 
taking into account different sources of investment for AET. 
2.2 Investment patterns in AET in international comparisons 
Who invests in AET? Generally, the major part of further education is at least 
partly paid by employers (e.g. Brunello et al. 2007; Desjardins et al. 2006; 
Desjardins and Rubenson 2011). FIBS and DIE (2013, 75ff.) include several data 
and information sources for estimating the distribution of state, employer and 
individual funding for adult education in selected countries. Results support that 
employers are the main investor in most countries. 3  However, heterogeneous 
patterns on the amount of investment by other stakeholders are identified (ibid.). 
Overall, countries representing sociodemocratic welfare state regimes show higher 
state investment in AET. For other stakeholders no coherent pattern by welfare 
state resp. welfare production regimes is noticeable. But, indicators referred to do 
not allow differentiating e.g. states institutional or individual funding or vocational 
vs. non-vocational adult learning (ibid.).  
Indicators used for identifying employer support in analyses based on 
individual data are quite diverse and comparable only to a limited extent. 
Desjardins et al. (2006, 55ff.) identify similar patterns for participating in AET 
overall and employer-sponsored AET. 4  In general, results reveal the familiar 
pattern of privileged groups participating in AET; job tasks and reading 
                                                     
3 Information on relations of funding volume for adult learning is included by referring to 
data of the AES 2007, CVTS4, information by national experts, statistical offices and/or 
ministries. Methodological issues are still present due to diverse sources of information and 
istinctions in different countries (FIBS and DIE 2013, 75ff.). 
4 Employer-sponsored AET is defined if direct or indirect expenses for AET participation 
are covered by the employer (Desjardins et al. 2006, 55ff.). 
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competencies influence participation in employer-sponsored AET. Further analyses 
reveal that jobs skill content is even more important for predicting employer-
sponsored AET-participation than educational attainment or literacy proficiency 
(Desjardins and Rubenson 2011, 25f.).5 Focusing on (mis)match between job tasks 
and skill level, results show that workers in high-skill matches are most likely to 
receive employer-sponsored AET, followed by employees in deficit situations, in 
surplus situations and least likely are those in low-skill matches. AET supported by 
state investment is nearly equally distributed between these groups. Self-financing 
AET is most likely for workers in high-skill matches and those in surplus situations. 
Differences between countries regarding inequalities for participating in employer-
sponsored AET exist, but are not focused on (ibid., 55ff.). 
Results by Brunello et al. (2007, 207-209) reveal similar patterns for 
employer-sponsored and training without a differentiation by investment. 6 
Nonetheless, some distinctions are striking comparing ‘employer-sponsored 
training’ and ‘non-sponsored training’ regarding the influence of gender, company 
size, contract and work time. Women are more likely than men to participate in ‘all 
training’ but less likely to participate in employer-sponsored AET. Employees in 
small enterprises “(..) pay more often (..) to compensate for the lack of employer 
support.” (ibid., 210). Similarly, workers in fixed term contracts and part-time 
work are less likely to participate in employer-sponsored and more likely to 
participate in non-employer-sponsored AET than full-time workers and those with 
permanent contracts. The influence of gender and company size is supported by 
data of the third Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS3, 2005). In large 
companies women receive less often company sponsored training than men and 
employees in small firms less than those in large ones (Behringer and Schönfeld 
2012, 29ff.). Analyses for Germany support the central influence of workplace 
characteristics (representing demand) on employer-sponsored AET participation as 
this is mainly affected by job tasks, job complexity and other firm related 
characteristics (Görlitz and Tamm 2011, 15ff. 7 ; Kaufmann and Widany 2013, 
43ff.8). Brunello et al. (2007, 212ff.; 228) compare countries regarding the impact 
of determinants to participate in AET in general, not distinguishing different forms 
of investment.9 Overall, country effects are considerable and even stronger than 
those held by education, age, occupation, firm size and industry (ibid., 208ff.). 
Whereas these results support the assumptions of macro-level indicators 
determining (nation-specific) supply structures for AET, a systematic pattern is not 
identified.  
                                                     
5 Employer-sponsored AET is defined if respondents received any financial support of 
employers. If financial support is received by government and no support by employers 
AET is defined as government financed. If respondents paid for AET participation without 
any financial support by employer or government, AET is categorized as self-financed 
(Desjardins and Rubenson 2011, 25f.). 
6 Employer-sponsored training is defined if it is being paid or provided by employers 
(Brunello et al. 2007,  218). 
7 Training carried out by the firm is defined as on-the-job training (ONJT), by another 
institution is defined as off-the-job training (OFFJT) (Görlitz and Tamm 2011, 4). 
8 Company-sponsored AET is defined as job related, taking place during working hours 
only and being free of charge or fully paid by employer (Kaufmann and Widany 2013, 40). 
9 In-depth analyses distinguishing employer-supported and non-employer supported AET 
are run with UK as reference country. Results are not interpreted regarding country 
differences (Brunello et al. 2007, 226ff.). 
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Besides financial support time investment in AET is central to account for. 
Tuor Sartore and Backes-Gellner (2014, 94ff. for Germany) find, that employer-
sponsored AET can be regarded as a non-wage component and by this, work 
release time is even more important than financial support for AET. In 
international comparison time constraints are reported to be the most important 
obstacle for AET participation, whereas lack of money is ranked fifth according to 
recent AES data (FIBS and DIE 2013, 100ff.). Further, analyses show that low 
educated workers are significantly less willing to invest time for AET than higher 
educated workers (Fourage et al. 2010 for The Netherlands). Hence, time 
investments are important to account for to strictly distinguish employer- and non-
employer-sponsored AET. Accounting for both, financial and time investment of 
employers and employees and distinguishing these distinctively Kaufmann and 
Widany (2013, 43ff. for Germany) differentiate purely company-sponsored and 
self-financed AET and a co-financed format of AET where employer and 
employee share financial and/or time investment. Of all job-related AET-cases 
24 % are accounted to this co-financed format that is usually not included in 
analyses on AET participation.10 By distinguishing these three formats, differences 
on determinants are revealed. In comparison, co-financed AET participation is less 
influenced by formal qualifications whereas workplace characteristics and the 
absence of an infrastructure for AET are important for engaging in co-financed 
AET. Further, solidly entrenched AET-infrastructures are crucial and more 
important than firm size or branch for the supply of fully company-sponsored AET 
and for reducing the need of individuals to compensate a lack of company support 
by self-financed AET (ibid.). This corresponds to findings based on CVTS2 data 
(1999) for Germany and Sweden where collective agreements on AET as well as 
public or AET-fond revenues influence employer-provided AET (Mytzek-Zühlke 
2007, 226f.). 
Overall, research supports that AET participation is conditional to opportunity 
structures and cross-country-differences exist, even if investment in AET is 
distinguished. Several macro-level characteristics are identified as relevant 
influence factors, but a systematic pattern of country specific constitutions has not 
been revealed. Overall, factors representing demand are of relevance whereas 
results on indicators representing the supply side are more inconsistent. Regarding 
investment in AET, time has so far not been included in international comparative 
analyses for differentiating AET by investment. Nor have co-financed formats of 
AET been considered where several parties (e.g. employers, employees, state) 
share investments. Generally, shared investment of different stakeholders exists in 
several European countries in heterogeneous compositions (Cedefop 2008, 3f.; 
23ff.) and approaches prominently referred to stress the role of structural 
conditions for encouraging individuals and firms to invest in further education. 
Therefore, the relevant distinction of AET by investment is addressed empirically 
in the following sections. 
 
                                                     
10  Percentages refer to activities including multiple participation. Share of company-
supported AET is highest with 75 % of the whole amount of job-related AET, 9 % are fully 
self-financed. Participation rates in job related AET overall are 42,2 %, splitting into 
31,8 % fully company-supported, 3,9 % self-financed and 10,2 % co-financed (Kaufmann 
and Widany 2013, 40). 
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3 Research question and theoretical assumptions 
In an initial step participation rates in AET differentiated by forms of investment in 
selected European countries are analysed against the theoretical backdrop of the 
VoC-approach (Estevez-Abé et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). Considering job 
related AET only, the following assumptions are derived. Countries classified as 
CMEs are likely to promote investment in AET by both, employers and employees. 
Due to high social protection, labour is not easy to dismiss for employers. In 
combination with product market strategies relying on (firm-/industry-) specific 
skills, which are related to constant investment in workforce training, employers 
are expected to invest in AET of their employees, as returns of training are 
expected to be higher than dismissing and recruiting new labour (Dieckhoff et al. 
2007, 84). On the other hand, also employees are likely to invest in AET as 
employment protection is relatively high, securing such expenses. Furthermore, 
individual investment might lead to returns in terms of higher job positions within 
or by changing companies. Due to product market strategies relying on industry-
/occupational specific skills, job changes are expected to be relatively easy and not 
associated with a monetary or positional downturn for employees. Contrarily, in 
LMEs characterized by low social protection legislations, a general skill regime 
combined with product market strategies relying on general rather than specific 
qualifications, updating skills is expected to be necessary mainly for highly 
qualified workers resp. those in jobs with high skill requirements (ibid.). Yet, as 
employer-sponsored AET can be regarded as a non-wage component (Sartore et al. 
2014) companies’ investments in AET can be viable also for workers with lower 
qualifications. Therefore, sharing costs between employers and employees is 
assumingly worthwhile for both. AET solely financed by individuals is expected to 
occur in LMEs, too. Updating general skills is presumably not supported by 
employers so individuals have to invest in such training themselves. Assumingly 
countries classified as DMEs will show similar patterns as LMEs. In 
Mediterranean countries, characterized by medium social protection legislations, 
general skill formation systems and pronounced segmented labour markets, firms 
investment in AET of employers is likely to occur, but unevenly distributed in 
favour for those in internal labour markets (Dieckhoff et al. 2007, 86) . In France 
the established fonds-system for financing AET (e.g. Bosch 2010) might lead to a 
more equal distribution of access to employer-sponsored AET. Similar as for 
LMEs, shared investment of employers and employees is expected to occur in 
Mediterranean Countries, too. Completely individually financed training is 
expected to be less pronounced in Mediterranean countries, due to established 
internal labour market structures and in France due to the institutionalized fond-
system. 
So overall, it is assumed that the amount of AET sponsored purely by 
companies as well as by individuals will be higher in CMEs than in LMEs and 
DMEs. Mediterranean Countries are expected to be in between these poles. Apart 
from the influence of labour market related regulations and characteristics of 
country-specific education and training systems, information on public support for 
individuals’ participation in NFE is of interest. State support for individuals AET 
participation is expected to be more pronounced in countries classified as CME’s 
and within these, more prominent in sociodemocratic welfare state regimes. 
Patterns of shared investment are primarily of exploratory interest. For 
investigating if this AET format is of relevance in other European countries and if 
K. Kaufmann  
 
IJRVET 2015 
148 
different patterns can be related to welfare production regimes, countries are 
selected as follows. Representing CMEs Germany, Norway and Sweden are chosen. 
Whereas Germany is further characterised as corporatistic, Norway and Sweden 
represent a sociodemocratic welfare state regime. The UK represents a LME; 
Lithuania and Latvia stand for DMEs, France and Spain are included as examples 
for Mediterranean countries. 
4 Data base, sample selection and operationalisations 
Analyses are based on data of the Adult Education Survey (AES) 2011/12 that is 
conducted on an obligatory base in all European Member states, starting in 2011/12 
(EC No. 452/2008; EU No. 823/2010).11 The cross-sectional survey is repeated 
every five years, covering a representative sample of individuals aged 25-64 in 
each country (EU No. 823/2010). Collecting information on adults’ education 
participation, the AES refers to the Classification of learning activities (European 
Commission and Eurostat, 2006) Hence, information on formal education (FED), 
non-formal education (NFE) and informal learning (INF) are collected; reference 
period are the twelve months prior to the interview (European Commission and 
Eurostat 2014, 7). Main distinctive criterion of FED and NFE is the 
acknowledgement within the national qualification framework (NFQ, European 
Commission and Eurostat 2012, 4ff.). For answering the research question, only 
non-formal education (NFE) activities that have been done for job related reasons 
are referred to. 12  By this, the recommendation by some researchers not to 
differentiate FED and NFE in international comparative analyses (Behringer and 
Schönfeld 2014, 385; Behringer et al. 2013, 333f.) is not followed. Their main 
argument refers to differences between countries acknowledging learning activities 
in the NFQ. By this, identical learning activities might be classified as FED in one 
country and as NFE in another (ibid.). Reasons for not following this 
recommendation are that (1) information whether the learning activity was job-
related is not collected for FED, (2) analyses based on an activity dataset focusing 
on differences of participation and investment patterns by distinguishing and 
combining formal and non-formal education (Reichart and Kaufmann 2015) 
suggest that diverse structures between FED and NFE exist, especially regarding 
finance patterns. If FED and NFE are combined, these differences would be missed. 
The sample is restricted to the working population aged 25-64, excluding family 
workers and those who currently participate in formal education (FED). Sample 
sizes for the selected countries are displayed in table 1.  
                                                     
11 Data used in this contribution are provided by Eurostat, Unit B-1. Access is granted to 
the microdata set Adult Education Survey (AES) according to the research proposal no. 
69/2014-AES. 
12 Information of 1st and 2nd NFE activity is included. Some countries collect information 
on more than two NFE-activities but not all countries included in this paper (European 
Commission and Eurostat 2014, 29). 
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Table 1 Sample sizes for selected countries 
Welfare 
producti
on 
regime 
CME CME Mediterranean Countries DME LME 
Country 
Norw
ay 
Swede
n 
German
y 
Spain France Lithua
nia 
Latvia UK 
N – 
unweighte
d data 
2195 2470 4190 9535 9614 2741 3386 2163 
N – 
weighted 
data 
2.080. 
454 
3.875. 
033 
32.059.626 15.970.
988 
24.976. 
113 
1.151. 
194 
833.797 21.465. 
838 
Note. Norway and Sweden can be regarded as representatives of sociodemocratic welfare 
state regimes, Germany, Spain and France as representatives of conservative/corporatistic 
welfare state regimes. Source: AES 2011/2012, SUF, own calculations 
Participation rates vary between countries, displaying more or less the familiar 
pattern of countries with high participation rates in the Nordic countries and lower 
rates in Lithuania and Latvia. Further, NFE participation is mainly job related in all 
countries. 
Primarily following Kaufmann and Widany (2013) information on financial 
and time investment of employers and individuals in job related NFE is used to 
distinguish company-sponsored and self-financed NFE distinctively. Accordingly, 
‘company-sponsored NFE’ is defined as being fully financed by the company or 
free of cost for the participant and taking place during working hours only. ‘Self-
financed NFE’ is paid fully by the participant and taking place outside working 
hours only. Shared investment between employers and employees for NFE either 
by time or money is considered in the ‘co-financed-employer-individual NFE’ 
format. Due to limited cases numbers NFE financed purely by state support cannot 
be distinguished. However, there are a considerable number of NFE incidents 
characterised by a combination of investment by employer, individual and public 
employment services or other public institutions for NFE. These constitute an own 
format termed ‘co-financed pooled-employer-individual-state’ NFE. Table 2 
summarizes the classification criteria according to financial and time investments. 
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Table 2 Classification of NFE-activities by financial and time investments of 
employers, employees and state 
NFE participation for job related reasons 
Company-
sponsored Self-financed 
Co-financed-
employer-
individual 
Co-financed-pooled-
employer-individual-
state 
costs fully paid by 
employer OR free of 
charge 
costs fully paid by 
individual OR free 
of charge 
costs paid by 
employer AND by 
individual 
costs paid by employer 
AND individual AND 
public employment services 
or other public institutions 
AND fully during 
working hours AND fully outside 
working hours 
during or outside 
working hours 
during or outside working 
hours OR Guided on the job 
training* 
Note. *In AES 2011/2012 ‘Guided on the job training’ is collected as a format of NFE and 
by definition it is assumed that this takes place during working hours only (European 
Commission and Eurostat 2012, 6ff.; 35f.; European Commission and Eurostat 2013, 28ff.). 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptives 
According to the above specified classifications only cases holding valid 
information on the purpose (job related/not job related) and on financial and time 
investment for NFE are included. By this, Sweden and the UK reveal a high 
number of missings; the other countries show negligible missing values in the 
relevant variables. Including information of first and second NFE activity, 
participation rates for the differentiated formats in the selected countries show that 
purely company-sponsored NFE is the most prominent format (figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 Participation rates in job related NFE (1st and 2nd) distinguished by 
financial and time investments of employers, individuals and state. Source: 
AES 2011/2012 SUF, weighted data; own calculations. 
The pattern follows previous results of highest rates in CME countries, lowest in 
DMEs and Spain as a Mediterranean country in between. Regarding differences in 
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the amount of purely company-sponsored NFE results are generally in line with 
theoretical assumptions of cross-country differences in relation to welfare-
production regimes. However, participation in purely company-sponsored NFE in 
France is as high as in Germany, probably reflecting the established fond concept 
in France, where companies are obliged to invest a certain amount of their total 
payroll in an AET-fond (Cedefop 2008, 81ff.). Self-financing NFE is hardly 
prevailed and only partly supporting theoretical assumptions according to welfare 
production regimes. Highest rates in Germany (4.2 %) as a CME and in the Baltic 
States representing DMEs were expected. Yet, self-financing NFE in Spain as a 
Mediterranean country with pronounced internal labor markets was unexpected but 
could be related to the recent financial crisis. Also unexpected is identifying any 
case of self-financed NFE in the UK, representing a LME. The latter result is 
startling but as information is missing in so many cases in the UK and in Sweden 
results should be interpreted only cautiously. Referring to the abovementioned 
concerns that learning activities might be classified differently in various countries, 
analyses were conducted for FED, too. Yet again, no cases of self-financed AET 
were identified for the UK. The estimations by FIBS and DIE (2013, 75ff.) reveal 
results as theoretically expected for the UK. Similarities to the descriptives 
presented occur regarding individual investments in AET being more prominent in 
Germany and Spain (ibid., 78). Interestingly, for Norway results are more diverse 
as FIBS and DIE (ibid.) identify a relatively small amount of employer and 
individual investment and a high amount of state funding, the latter corresponding 
strongly to theoretical assumptions of welfare state regimes. 
 Overall, descriptive results suggest, that shared investment in NFE is 
relatively prevailed in all selected countries. Employers and employees investing 
together in NFE (co-financed employer-individual) is common with highest rates 
in Norway and Germany. Overall, the theoretically expected pattern is supported 
but for the relatively high amount of co-financed-employer-individual NFE in 
Latvia. The co-financed pooled NFE format, where the investment is shared 
between companies, individuals and public authorities is surprisingly widespread 
in Spain, Latvia and Lithuania, followed then by Germany and France. Referring to 
assumptions by the VoC-approach, results are unexpected especially for the Baltic 
States. This might reflect the fact that a large share of funding is provided by EU 
and ESF programs in these countries (e.g. GHK and Research voor Beleid 2011a, 
2011b; Cedefop 2012a, 2012b). As co-financed formats of NFE have not been 
investigated in an international comparative perspective so far, results indicate that 
these formats are common in several European countries, however, not consistently 
following a theoretically expected pattern. Whether the distinction of these NFE 
formats is relevant also in terms of determinants for participation is investigated in 
the following section. 
5.2 Multivariate results 
For analysing participation patterns in the distinguished NFE formats logistic 
regressions are conducted where participation in the respective format constitutes 
the dependent variable. Estimations are carried out separately for the selected 
countries. As a high amount of information is missing for Sweden and the UK 
these are excluded from further analyses. Due to limited case numbers in some 
NFE formats for Lithuania and Latvia data for these countries are pooled, since 
both represent DMEs and overall show similar participation rates. Considering case 
numbers, estimations for self-financed AET are carried out for Germany, the Baltic 
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States and Spain only.13 Again, due to limited case numbers Norway has to be 
excluded from analyses for the co-financed pooled format. In terms of theoretical 
implications countries included still cover all welfare production regime 
classifications. 
 Independent variables are selected according to the state of research and 
theoretical assumptions of influence factors representing supply and demand for 
participating in NFE. Accordingly, individual related characteristics as age, gender 
and formal qualification grades are included. Job related variables representing 
demand aspects are enclosed covering occupational classification, firm size, type 
of contract, duration of employment within the current company and full- vs. part-
time work. Due to limited case numbers, branch indicators cannot be controlled for 
and categorizations of several variables had to be conflated. Results of logistic 
regression estimations are displayed as odds ratios. Regarding the effect size odds 
ratios are often interpreted in a misleading way and can be compared only in terms 
of direction (increase/decrease) and significance of effects across models and 
samples but not in terms of the amount of in-/decrease. Therefore, logistic 
regressions are additionally estimated based on a pooled dataset for all countries, 
controlling for country effects. Based on these results, mean predicted probabilities 
for selected independent variables on the dependent variable (participating in the 
respective NFE format) are plotted, differentiated by countries (Best and Wolf 
2010, 832f.; Bauer 2010, 917ff.). 
 Overall, estimations for company-sponsored NFE reflect the state of research 
of individual and job related characteristics influencing participation. Model fit 
indicators suggest a reasonable fit for all countries for explaining participation in 
purely company-sponsored NFE; slightly better for Germany, the Baltic States and 
France than for Norway and Spain (tab. 3). For self-financed NFE indicators 
suggest a reasonable model fit for the Baltic States but a better fit for Germany and 
Spain (tab. 6). For the co-financed formats model fit indicators are generally not as 
good as for the company-sponsored NFE format, but apart from Norway, overall 
reasonable (tab. 4, 5). For explaining participation in co-financed pooled NFE 
model fit parameters are quite similar to the co-financed employer-employee 
format, apart from Spain. Here, indicators suggest a better model fit for the co-
financed-pooled format. Generally, these results suggest that relevant determinants 
for explaining participation in the co-financed NFE formats are not yet included 
and require further investigation.  
 Regarding age, the pattern for purely company-sponsored NFE is quite similar 
across countries. Compared to the age group of 35-44 year olds, people aged 55 
and above are less likely to participate in company-sponsored NFE but the two 
Baltic States. As former results are not consistent regarding age and trend analyses 
suggest that AET participation of older workers overall increased (e.g. Riphahn 
and Trübswetter 2007; Schiener 2006; Seifried and Berger 2011) this result seems 
to confirm the investment logic of employers to invest primarily in younger 
employees. This is underlined by the fact that increasing age is not consistent for 
influencing participation in the co-financed NFE formats. Only in the 
Mediterranean countries workers aged 55 and older are less likely than 35-44 year 
olds to participate in co-financed employer-individual NFE whereas in the 
remaining countries no significant age effect is identified. This result might reflect 
pronounced internal labour markets combined with a general skill formation 
                                                     
13 Number of observations should be at least 100 (Best and Wolf 2010, 837). 
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system in the Mediterranean countries, affording (shared) investment in AET by 
the time entering the labour market (e.g. Gangl 2003; Brzinsky-Fay 2007). For 
Spain, this is supported by the fact that workers aged 45-54 are less likely to invest 
in NFE themselves compared to those aged 35-44. In the remaining countries, self-
financed NFE is not influenced by age. Regarding co-financed-pooled NFE 
workers aged 45-54 are more likely than 35-44 year olds to participate in Spain and 
in Germany. Presumably, specific funding instruments for this age group are of 
relevance in these countries. Overall, gender related participation patterns for NFE 
distinguished by investment support former results of women being less likely to 
participate in company-sponsored NFE and being more prone to cover at least 
some investment by themselves (e.g. Brunello et al. 2007; Kaufmann and Widany 
2013). Regarding country differences only results for company-sponsored NFE can 
be related to the theoretical differentiations of countries as only in Norway and 
Germany, representing CMEs with high social protection and (firm-/industry-) 
specific product market strategies, no significant gender differences occur. But 
contrasting, women in Germany are more likely to self-finance NFE or to share the 
investment with their employer. Regarding co-financed formats being female is 
associated with higher participation probabilities also in France for co-financed 
employer-individual, and in the Baltic States for co-financed pooled NFE. As 
interpretation in relation to welfare production regimes is less intuitive, results 
rather suggest that the disadvantage for women to participate in company-
sponsored NFE in the Baltic States is compensated by state involvement.  
 In all investigated countries the relevance of formal qualifications and 
occupational classifications for participation in purely company-sponsored NFE is 
noticeable with some interesting exceptions in some parameter characteristics. 
Formal qualification grades show the familiar pattern in all investigated countries, 
but in the Baltic States, where no differences between low educated and workers 
with higher education can be observed for participating in company-sponsored 
NFE. But this might be due to smaller case numbers in this category in these 
countries. Further, in Norway, Germany and France, no significant differences are 
observed between low skilled nonmanual and high skilled nonmanual occupational 
classifications for participating in company-sponsored training. This indicates, that 
occupational related aspects such as nonmanual job tasks (representing demand for 
AET) are the relevant aspect for companies’ decisions to invest in training whereas 
the level of qualification (representing supply) seems to be of less relevance in 
these countries. Regarding expected patterns according to the VoC-approach, these 
results might reflect the pronounced social protection combined with mainly (firm-
/industry-) specific skill-requirement and -supply patterns in Norway and Germany, 
making it profitable to invest also in workers in jobs with lower skill affordance. 
As for France, the pattern might reflect the obligatory fond-system for NFE for 
firms as mentioned. For self-financed NFE results suggest reduced probabilities for 
those with lower qualifications and lower occupational classifications in all 
countries. Plotted mean probabilities within each country suggest for all countries a 
rather small impact of these parameters for self-financed NFE (not displayed). 
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Table 3 Estimation results of logistic regressions for participation in company-
sponsored NFE  
 
DV = Participation in company-sponsored NFE 
 Norway Germany Baltic States Spain France 
 Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) 
individual– 
supply 
side 
Age RC = 35-44 
25-34      
45-54     ,834** 
55-64 ,649** ,705**  ,720*** ,575*** 
Sex RC= Male   ,801** ,838** ,783*** 
Formal 
qualification 
RC = ISCED 5-
6 
ISCED 0-2 ,347*** ,424***  ,592*** ,501*** 
ISCED 3-4 ,708** ,663*** ,657*** ,815** ,820** 
job related 
– 
demand 
side 
Occupational 
classification 
RC = high 
skilled non-
manual  
elementary 
occupations  ,266*** ,352*** ,165*** ,420*** ,643*** 
low skilled 
nonmanual   ,596*** ,823**  
skilled 
manual ,601** ,568*** ,308*** ,841* ,536*** 
Contract RC= 
unlimited 
contract 
Limited 
contract   ,521*  ,480*** 
Self-
employed ,147*** ,256*** ,392*** ,700** ,148*** 
Work Time RC = full time  ,796*  ,769** ,672*** 
Duration 
company 
employment 
z-
standardized ,833**  1,293***   
squared 1,136**  ,891**   
Company 
size 
RC= 1-10 
persons 
11-49 
persons  1,281* 1,301* 1,289*** 1,829*** 
50 persons & 
more / 2,023*** 1,855*** 1,698*** 2,998*** 
Constant 1,645*** ,953 ,551*** ,532*** ,763** 
-2 Log-Likelihood 2583,906 4567,662 4914,807 9052,639 9162,402 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0,098 0,132 0,150 0,072 0,180 
N 1980 3618 5236 7786 7510 
Note. Significant results displayed only. *p≤0.050; **p≤0.010; ***p≤0.001. Source: AES 
2011/2012 SUF, unweighted data, own calculations.  
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Table 4 Estimation results of logistic regressions for participation in co-
financed NFE – employer-individual 
 DV = Participation in co-financed NFE – employer-
individual 
 Norway Germany Baltic States Spain France 
 Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) 
individual– 
supply 
side 
Age RC = 35-44 
25-34      
45-54    ,730*  
55-64    ,552** ,592** 
Sex RC= Male  1,383*   1,732*** 
Formal 
qualification 
RC = ISCED 5-
6 
ISCED 0-2 
 ,349**  ,653** ,595* 
ISCED 3-4 ,670* ,645** ,539*** ,751* ,718* 
job related 
– 
demand 
side 
Occupational 
classification 
RC = high 
skilled non-
manual  
elementary 
occupations  
 ,243*** ,256*** ,283*** ,298*** 
low skilled 
nonmanual 
 ,492*** ,535*** ,663*** ,401*** 
skilled 
manual  ,461*** ,302*** ,380*** ,411*** 
Contract RC= 
unlimited 
contract 
Limited 
contract 
     
Self-
employed  2,719***   4,145*** 
Work Time RC = full time ,568*  ,401*   
Duration 
company 
employment 
z-
standardized   1,384***  1,342*** 
squared      
Company 
size 
RC= 1-10 
persons 
11-49 
persons 
     
50 persons & 
more /  ,676* 1,646***  
Constant ,238*** ,171*** ,162*** ,100*** ,101*** 
-2 Log-Likelihood 1527,035 2108,883 2246,239 3198,296 3161,870 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0,032 0,083 0,106 0,059 0,086 
N 1980 3618 5236 7786 7510 
Note. Significant results displayed only. *p≤0.050; **p≤0.010; ***p≤0.001. Source: AES 
2011/2012 SUF, unweighted data, own calculations. 
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Table 5 Estimation results of logistic regressions for participation in co-
financed-pooled-employer-individual-state NFE  
 DV = 
Participation in co-financed-pooled – employer-
individual-state NFE 
 Germany Baltic States Spain France 
 Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) 
individual– 
supply side 
Age RC = 35-44 
25-34     
45-54 1,771*  1,347*  
55-64     
Sex RC= Male  2,087***   
Formal 
qualification 
RC = ISCED 5-6 
ISCED 0-2   ,381*** ,480* 
ISCED 3-4 ,512** ,472*** ,624***  
job related 
– 
demand 
side 
Occupational 
classification 
RC = high skilled 
non-manual  
elementary 
occupations 
 ,264*** ,194***  
low skilled 
nonmanual  ,429*** ,440***  
skilled manual ,334* ,297*** ,278*** ,475** 
Contract RC= unlimited 
contract 
Limited contract 
2,062** 2,841** 2,231*** 3,138*** 
Self-employed  1,809*  3,674*** 
Work Time RC = full time ,537*    
Duration 
company 
employment 
z-standardized ,523***  1,179* ,748* 
squared 1,273**    
Company 
size 
RC= 1-10 persons 
11-49 persons   1,637***  
50 persons & 
more   1,539** ,630* 
Constant ,027* ,047*** ,097*** ,039*** 
-2 Log-Likelihood 942,146 1751,444 3317,816 1722,207 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0,086 0,119 0,118 0,066 
N 3618 5236 7786 7510 
Note. Significant results displayed only. *p≤0.050; **p≤0.010; ***p≤0.001. Due to limited 
case numbers Norway had to be excluded from estimations for co-financed-pooled-
employer-individual-state NFE. Source: AES 2011/2012 SUF, unweighted data; own 
calculations. 
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Table 6 Estimation results of logistic regressions for participation in self-
financed NFE 
 DV = 
Participation in self-financed NFE 
 Germany Baltic States Spain 
 Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) 
individual– 
supply side 
Age RC = 35-44 
25-34    
45-54   ,606* 
55-64    
Sex RC= Male 1,702*   
Formal 
qualification 
RC = ISCED 5-6 
ISCED 0-2 ,125* ,126* ,304*** 
ISCED 3-4  ,553* ,640* 
job related – 
demand side 
Occupational 
classification 
RC = high skilled 
non-manual  
elementary 
occupations 
,092** ,293* ,408* 
low skilled 
nonmanual ,372***  ,505*** 
skilled manual ,506* ,427* ,478** 
Contract RC= unlimited 
contract 
Limited contract 
1,865* 4,947*** 2,296*** 
Self-employed 5,731*** 2,233* 2,221** 
Work Time RC = full time 1,665*   
Duration 
company 
employment 
z-standardized ,718*   
squared    
Company 
size 
RC= 1-10 persons 
11-49 persons   1,747** 
50 persons & more   1,539* 
Constant ,042* ,037*** ,034*** 
-2 Log-Likelihood 992,836 1087,6 1897,467 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0,147 0,068 0,106 
N 3618 5236 7786 
Note. Significant results displayed only. *p≤0.050; **p≤0.010; ***p≤0.001. Due to limited 
case numbers Norway and France had to be excluded from estimations for self-financed 
NFE. Source: AES 2011/2012 SUF, unweighted data, own calculations. 
Comparing these results to the co-financed NFE formats some differences arise. 
For all countries but Norway a very similar pattern regarding the influence of 
formal qualifications and occupational classifications as for participation in purely 
company-sponsored NFE is identified for co-financed-employer-individual NFE. 
For Norway, results suggest that relevant determinants are missing. As this NFE 
format is comparably wide spread in Norway this result is at least unexpected. For 
co-financed-pooled NFE, where investment of the state is involved, too, in all 
countries but Germany and France medium qualifications and lower occupational 
positions are negatively associated with participation. In terms of country 
differences, patterns can only cautiously be related to welfare production regimes. 
E.g. the result that workers in elementary and low-skilled nonmanual occupational 
job positions are not less likely to participate in co-financed-pooled NFE than those 
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in high skilled non-manual positions in Germany and France suggest that public 
funding initiatives outweigh lack of pure employer support which could cautiously 
be related to both countries representing corporatistic welfare state regimes.  
Turning towards other job related characteristics influencing NFE participation 
findings for purely company-sponsored NFE reflect previous results of higher 
probabilities for employees in larger companies, but Norway.14 For the co-financed 
formats the influence of company size is different with some opposing effects 
between countries. Apart from Spain and the Baltic States, firm size is of no 
relevance for participation in co-financed employer-individual NFE. The pattern 
for the Baltic States, where skill formation systems provide rather generally 
educated workers, simply suggests that shared investment in AET outweighs the 
difficulties of smaller firms to provide fully company-sponsored NFE. As for Spain, 
employees in bigger firms are more likely to participate in NFE, no matter whether 
the investment is shared between employers and individuals or additionally being 
sup-ported by the state, supposing to reflect the pronounced internal labour market 
structures. Regarding shared investment in NFE by employers, individuals and the 
state results for France show that workers in large firms are less likely to 
participate than those working in small companies. Again, this pattern suggests that 
public support compensates for lack of employer support in small companies in 
France. 
 In all countries self-employed are less likely to participate in purely company-
sponsored NFE and more likely to participate in one of the co-financed NFE 
formats. As the distinction of spending private time and money for NFE is 
presumably easier for employed than self-employed, the result might just reflect 
differences in classifying financial and time investments. But in France and in the 
Baltic States self-employed are more likely to participate in co-financed pooled 
NFE than those with permanent contracts, suggesting the existence of specific 
funding instruments for self-employed for NFE in these countries; a relation to 
welfare production regimes can hardly be made. Similarly, workers with limited 
contracts are more prone to participate in co-financed pooled NFE than those with 
unlimited contracts in all countries. Whereas in Norway, Germany and Spain 
differences only exist between self-employed and employees with permanent 
contracts, workers with limited contracts in France and the Baltic States are less 
likely to receive company-sponsored NFE than those in permanent positions. For 
CME countries this pattern supports theoretical assumptions as product market 
strategies relying on specific skills constantly afford regular skill refreshment. For 
France the result supports investment logics of employers in strong internal labour 
markets, whereas for the Baltic States the result could just reflect firms’ general 
investment logics for AET in workers with highest returns anticipated. Further, 
workers with limited contracts are more likely to self-finance NFE in Germany, 
Spain and the Baltic States. Overall, these results go in line with assumptions 
according to welfare production regimes. In CMEs self-investment is likely to 
yield returns in terms of better job positions within or by changing companies. In 
the Baltic States workers in limited positions might just have to outweigh lack of 
company-support which is also relevant in Spain with strong internal labour 
markets.  
                                                     
14 The data for Norway provide any cases for firm size with 50 or more employees. For the 
remaining categories of 1 to 10 and 11 to 49 employees no differences for NFE 
participation are observed. 
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Working part-time is negatively associated with participation in company-
sponsored NFE in Germany, Spain and France. This negative relation of part-time 
work is also observed for co-financed-employer-individual NFE in the Baltic 
States and Norway. Positively associated is part-time work with self-financed NFE 
in Germany. Finally, duration of employment in the current company is of mixed 
results for explaining participation in the diverse formats and countries. For 
company-sponsored NFE a significant influence is identified only for Norway and 
the Baltic States, but indicating opposite effects: In Norway firms seem to invest 
especially in the first years of employment in their employees, suggesting to 
smooth integration into the position whereas in the Baltic States the investment of 
firms obviously focuses more on updating skills of employees with a longer 
duration within the company. According to theoretical assumptions, however, this 
result is contradictory to expected patterns. 
 For getting an idea about the impact of selected parameters on participation in 
the NFE-formats, mean predicted probabilities based on results of logistic 
regressions with pooled data covering all countries are plotted for selected 
parameters, distinguished by countries (fig. 2, 3). For company-sponsored NFE 
results show a similar pattern in all countries, indicating the strongest impact of 
highly skilled non-manual occupations that seem most pronounced in Norway and 
Germany than the remaining countries. This pattern is also valid for co-financed 
employer-individual NFE. Predicting participation in co-financed-pooled NFE 
occupational classification is most relevant in Spain. For all countries and all NFE-
formats factors representing demand for AET (occupational classification) seem of 
higher relevance for predicting participation than those of supply (formal 
qualification, not displayed). 
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Figure 2 Predicted probabilities for participation in a) company-sponsored 
NFE, b) co-financed (employer-individual) NFE and c) co-financed pooled 
NFE of occupational classification in Norway, Germany, the Baltic States, 
France and Spain. Source: AES 2011/2012 SUF, unweighted data; own 
calculations. 
Regarding company size, predicted probabilities suggest a stronger influence for 
participation in company-sponsored NFE in Germany and France and smallest in 
the Baltic States. For all countries, the relatively small impact of company size for 
predicting participation in the co-financed NFE formats is visible (fig. 3). Yet 
again, for co-financed-employer-individual NFE influence of company size seems 
more pronounced in Norway and Germany. Contrarily, for co-financed pooled 
NFE influence of company size is most pronounced in Spain, lowest in Germany 
and France. These results overall support the above suggested interpretations with 
reference to the VoC-approach. 
a) company-sponsored NFE b) co-financed (employer-individual) NFE 
c) co-financed pooled NFE 
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Figure 3 Predicted probabilities for participation in a) company-sponsored 
NFE, b) co-financed (employer-individual) NFE and c) co-financed pooled 
NFE of firm size in Norway, Germany, the Baltic States, France and Spain. 
Source: AES 2011/2012 SUF, unweighted data; own calculations. 
Note. Regarding missing data for Norway: Norway provide any cases for firm size with 50 
or more employees. For the remaining categories of 1 to 10 and 11 to 49 employees no 
differences for NFE participation are observed. Due to limited case numbers Norway was 
excluded from estimations for co-financed-pooled NFE. 
 
6 Discussion 
Analyses on investment and participation patterns in selected European countries 
support that the major part of job related NFE is purely sponsored by employers, 
also if time is considered as an additional source of investment. Contrarily, pure 
individual investment in NFE is rare across countries. Prevailed in all countries are 
co-financed NFE formats. Results reveal not only the quantitative relevance but 
also different participation patterns for co-financed NFE formats compared to fully 
company-sponsored or self-financed NFE and between countries. Even though 
determinants included explain best participation in company-sponsored NFE, 
a) company-sponsored NFE b) co-financed (employer-individual) NFE 
c) co-financed pooled NFE 
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results emphasize the relevance to distinguish investment in AET distinctively and 
taking monetary and time investments into consideration. 
With reference to the VoC-approach, assumptions were derived regarding 
country-specific investment patterns in NFE by companies, individuals and the 
state. Results partly support theoretically expected patterns with highest rates of 
company-sponsored NFE in CMEs and lowest in LMEs and DMEs. Further, the 
relatively high amount of shared investment in NFE in CMEs was expected. But, 
identifying any case of self-financed NFE in the UK and relatively high rates of co-
financed pooled NFE in Latvia and Lithuania is unexpected. The result for the 
Baltic States might mirror a large share of NFE being project based and externally 
funded by EU programs (e.g. GHK and Research voor Beleid 2011a, 2011b). 
Determinants for participation are different between NFE formats and countries, 
however going only partly in line with theoretical assumptions according to the 
VoC-approach. Generally, cross-country differences are more pronounced for co-
financed formats and self-financed NFE than for purely company-sponsored NFE. 
For the latter, differences between countries are mainly identified for specific 
categories of parameters (e.g. for nonmanual occupational activities) but less often 
for whole parameters being (not) identified as relevant influence factors. By this, 
previous results are mainly supported, revealing the strong influence of formal 
qualifications, occupational classifications, company size and full- vs. part-time 
work, reflecting the interplay of supply and demand factors for explaining 
company-sponsored NFE participation. Even though, differences are detected 
regarding the effects of certain influencing factors and model fit indicators between 
countries, patterns are generally very similar for participation in company-
sponsored NFE across countries. Model fit indicators reveal the relatively small 
impact of parameters included for explaining participation in NFE formats that are 
not fully sponsored by employers in all countries. This suggests that relevant 
parameters are associated with participation in the co-financed NFE formats that 
are not controlled for. Nevertheless, different participation patterns for the diverse 
NFE formats emphasize the necessity to distinguish NFE by investment as co-
financed formats seem to compensate for a lack of employer support for NFE in 
some countries. Hence, referring to gross classifications of countries such as the 
VoC-approach for explaining cross-country differences in participation patterns for 
diverse NFE-formats should be regarded as a first orientating step, leading to more 
detailed and specified research questions. Even tough, previous analyses provide 
no consistent results of macro level indicators influencing incidence and inequality 
in access to AET, multilevel analyses controlling for e.g. (un-)employment 
protection or innovation indices could provide further insights into relations of 
company, individual and state investment in adults’ further education. Furthermore, 
controlling for durations and aims of participation for the diverse NFE-formats 
could lead to a deeper understanding of diverse investment logics of different 
stakeholders in different countries. 
Overall, promotion and support for NFE seems heterogeneous in different 
countries which is reflected only roughly in this paper by identifying diverse 
parameters influencing participation in the distinguished NFE formats by 
investment. Further exploration and differentiation is needed especially regarding 
the co-financed NFE formats. For investigating relations of investment in NFE by 
different stakeholders in different countries that lead to a more thorough 
interpretation of the interplay of supply and demand patterns, detailed information 
of country specific funding instruments and adult education provision should be 
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referred to. Such systematic review still providing comparable information across 
countries is quite a difficult task (FIBS and DIE 2013). In-depth comparisons 
including extensive information on country specific indicators of adult education 
provision, funding instruments and labour market structures seems a promising 
strategy for further investigations. Results presented could be referred to for 
identifying countries showing similar resp. diverse patterns of participation in 
diverse formats of NFE. 
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